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Can Law Schools Teach Values?
By CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER*
WHEN THE WATERGATE scandal broke, many Americans were
outraged that Richard Nixon's lawyers assisted his cover up. Attorneys,
they thought, should be especially vigilant about upholding the law.
Yet, instead of sounding the alarm, several of the nation's most promi-
nent lawyers-including the Attorney General-participated in the
plot. Some people called for new regulatory measures that could de-
tect and punish unethical behavior by attorneys. The organized bar,
however, responded by demanding that the nation's law schools obli-
gate every student to receive instruction in legal ethics. The bar appar-
ently believed (or wanted the public to believe) that John Mitchell
and John Dean would have behaved more honorably if only they had
been better instructed while in law school.1
When I taught the mandatory Professional Responsibility course
at the New York University School of Law, I would summarize these
facts in my opening lecture. I would then pause, draw a deep breath,
and say to the students, "O.K., then, let me be clear about this. If a
client-any client, even the President of the United States-asks you
to cover up a hotel break in, or participate in any other criminal activ-
ity, don't do it! That would be unethical!"
Most of the students laughed. That was partly because they re-
sented being forced to take "Professional Responsibility" and so ap-
preciated my willingness to poke fun at the requirement's pedigree.
But the joke also had a more philosophical point, one germane to our
topic here. If we want to deter people (including lawyers) from com-
mitting theft, fraud, or other crimes, a law school course is an ineffec-
tive tool for the task. Perhaps a more aggressive regulatory structure
could deter wrongdoing by lawyers. Perhaps stronger families and
communities could produce people (including, perhaps, law students
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and lawyers) with sturdier moral commitments. Perhaps one on one
mentorship or counseling could rescue some students who have
strayed from the true path. It seems naive, though, to suppose that a
mandatory law school class on the lawyer/client relationship could re-
habilitate students whose moral compasses are broken, wavering, or
fragile.
Yet, the theme for this symposium-"Teaching Values in Law
School"-presupposes that somehow (if not through the "legal ethics"
curriculum, then in some other way) law schools can indeed improve
the moral character of their students. Perhaps good teaching can save
students from becoming scoundrels after all. Or, if not, then perhaps
teachers can take well-intentioned students and make them more
egalitarian, more courageous, or better in some other way. Is that
plausible? In the pages that follow, I begin by reflecting on the diffi-
culties of teaching virtue. I then turn to some ways in which law
schools might nevertheless improve the behavior and moral under-
standing of their students.
I. Is Virtue Teachable?
How are values taught and learned? The process is mysterious. In
Plato's Meno, Socrates leads Meno through an extended discussion
about whether and how virtue can be taught. He theorizes that all
teaching involves teasing out knowledge already in some sense pos-
sessed by the student. Socrates elaborates this view by telling a fanciful
story about how immortal souls are reincarnated after collecting
knowledge during past lifetimes and between lifetimes. Socrates main-
tains that people have this knowledge in their souls at birth but need
to be made aware of it; hence, learning is a kind of remembering. 2
Socrates illustrates this point in one of the most famous episodes from
the Platonic corpus: using carefully constructed questions, Socrates
leads an uneducated slave boy to articulate the Pythagorean Theorem.
Socrates gets Meno to conclude that the boy knew the theorem all
along-he had merely forgotten it, and the teacher's task was to re-
mind him of what he knew.3
Taken literally, this view is wildly unconvincing, even if we put to
one side its supernatural elements. Some ideas may be embedded in
human nature (or, to use a more fashionable metaphor, hard-wired
into our brains) but it is preposterous to suppose that all knowledge-
2. See PLATO, MENO 81b-81e.
3. See id. at 82b-86b.
[Vol. 36
TEACHING VALUES SYMPOSIUM
the recipe for crme brulee, the details of the parole evidence rule, or
directions to your uncle's house in Winnipeg-is lodged within us,
needing only to be remembered rather than acquired. Can Socrates
really have meant to suggest otherwise? Perhaps recipes, legal techni-
calities, and road maps are too trivial to count as knowledge for Socra-
tes.4 Still, the Pythagorean Theorem itself seems to be knowledge that
we must acquire rather than recover. Socrates' clever questioning of
the slave boy proves only that Socrates knew the theorem well enough
to lead somebody else through it-not that the boy knew the theorem
before his conversation with Socrates, or even that he understood it
afterward.
In Plato's dialogues, however, superficial impressions are rarely
reliable. When Socrates propounds an unbelievable theory, there is
usually a deeper point. Even if learning is not remembering, it does
seem we must first know something to learn something. So, for exam-
ple, even if the slave boy did not know the Pythagorean Theorem, and
even if he could not articulate it without the benefit of Socrates' clever
questions, the boy did have to know how to answer those questions.
More generally, young geometers must be able to recognize what
counts as a step in a mathematical argument in order to learn the
proof for a theorem, and they must be able to recognize "triangles" in
order to start making claims about triangles.
Likewise, to learn a value, somebody must already know some-
thing-something a teacher can invoke in order to communicate the
value. What sort of knowledge would that be? Imagine a law student
named Antoinette who says, "I don't care that the poor have no bread;
that's their tough luck. Personally, I hope to get rich helping clients
create off-shore tax shelters." What could we say to Antoinette? Sup-
pose we tell her that gross poverty is inconsistent with the equality of
persons. "I don't believe in equality," says Antoinette. Now what do we
say? Is there any way to teach Antoinette the value of equality?
Perhaps Antoinette herself invoked the ideal of equality on a pre-
vious occasion. Perhaps, for example, she did so yesterday, in order to
complain about a grade she received-"you gave Albert credit for this
point, and it's unfair to treat me differently." If so, we could remind
Antoinette that she had previously endorsed the value of equality. If
we do not have any such examples handy, we might say to Antoinette,
"Wouldn't you feel that you were unjustly disadvantaged if you had
4. Alternatively, directions and recipes might (under ordinary circumstances) count
only as "right opinion," which, Socrates later suggests (in a passage'dealing with road
maps), can indeed be acquired. See id. at 97a-97b.
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nothing to eat?" "Of course I would," Antoinette might reply, "but that
doesn't mean that my feelings would be justified. In any event, I'm not
like the poor-they're lower class!"
Do we have any response? Suppose we introduce Antoinette to
Tiny Tim, a destitute young man who is intelligent and kind. We run
the risk that Antoinette's prejudice leads her to find Tim revolting.
Suppose, though, that she sympathizes with him. We say to her, "Now
don't you think it unjust that Tim, and others like him, are starving?"
Antoinette might reply, "You're right; I was mistaken. I see now that
the poor are no different from me. It is indeed unjust that they are
starving." Or she might say, "No, actually, Tim is like me and it's un-
just that he is starving-but he's different from the ordinary rabble,
who are disgusting and beneath my contempt." Or she might even say,
"Well, I like Tim, and I've invited him to eat cake and maybe I'll offer
him a job as my valet, but I still don't understand this equality busi-
ness. I'll be nice to him as long as it pleases me, but that's as far as it
goes.
Now, here is something remarkable: all of the dialectical strate-
gies canvassed above presuppose that Antoinette was mistaken when
she said that she did not believe in equality. They assume, in other
words, that our task is not so much to endow Antoinette with a value
that she previously lacked, but to remind her of a value that she had
ignored or forgotten. That is obviously what we are doing when we
point out to Antoinette that she invoked equality on a previous occa-
sion. It is also what we are doing if we encourage Antoinette to con-
cede that she would invoke equality if her circumstances were
different. And likewise, when we encourage Antoinette to sympathize
with Tim, we are assuming that she in fact endorses the value of equal-
ity but has made a mistake about its application: namely, she has
wrongly assumed that poor people are different from her in some
morally relevant way. And, as illustrated by the last of the responses
imagined above, if Antoinette really does not believe in equality at all,
it is unlikely that her sympathy for Tim will enable us to make any
headway.
There are more radical (one might say tyrannical) ways to re-edu-
cate Antoinette. Suppose, frustrated by her lack of sympathy for Tim
or her disdain for equality, we decide to make Antoinette stand in
Tim's shoes. We deprive her of her wealth and connections (How?
Who knows!) and leave her to fend for herself in some miserable
neighborhood she does not know. We watch from a distance, waiting
until Antoinette cries out to somebody, demanding that she be
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treated as an equal. After an interval, we rescue her. Perhaps cruel
necessity will have brought Antoinette to a kind of moral epiphany-
perhaps she will be sensitive to equality arguments in a way that she
never was before. Or perhaps not. She might regard her appeals to
equality as mere rhetoric, defensible on strategic but not moral
grounds. Indeed, the whole experience might make her hate egalitari-
ans and equality all the more, since egalitarians made her miserable.
Or she might simply continue to insist that she was different from
other poor people-she could appeal to equality, but those who are
truly lower class have no right to do so. What determines how Antoi-
nette will respond to her ordeal? What determines, in particular,
whether her suffering will make her more or less well disposed to
equality? The answer is not obvious, but it is at least possible that An-
toinette will become more attached to equality only if that ideal al-
ready has some grip on her before she is made to stand in Tim's place.
I do not mean to suggest that we are all born with our moral
outlooks embedded within us, complete and fully formed. That view
would be no less fantastic than Plato's myth about the multiple lives of
immortal souls. People growing up in different cultures have different
values. Most people growing up in the United States, for example, will
be more favorably disposed toward religious toleration than people
growing up in a fundamentalist theocratic society. Likewise, people in
different families tend to have different values and characters. It
seems undeniable that good parenting matters to a child's charac-
ter-although it is by no means obvious what good parenting is or
how much it can accomplish.
Still, our brief reflection upon the Meno shows that Socrates' sur-
prising theory-that "learning is a kind of remembering"-has more
to recommend it than first meets the eye. In particular, teaching val-
ues may have more to do with reminding people (making them more
aware) of values they already hold than with imparting new values. If
so, a good teacher does not so much change students as make them
into better versions of what they already are. Or, to reformulate the
point, moral education (and perhaps education more generally) is al-
most always ad hominem-not in the colloquial sense of being a per-
sonal insult, but in the literal sense of being addressed to the particular
person rather than only to abstract, impersonal standards of truth.5 In
5. For further discussion of this point in connection with the Supreme Court's "edu-
cative" function, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 972-73 (1992). In that article, I eventually concluded that the Su-
preme Court opinions could have a modest educative effect upon law students and others
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our imagined conversation with Antoinette, for example, we tried to
reinforce her commitment to equality by appealing to various of her
own opinions, experiences, or desires-her own past claims, her sense
of entitlement, her sympathies. To teach Antoinette effectively about
equality, we must know something not only about equality but about
Antoinette.
Ad hominem teaching is difficult in large classrooms. An argument
that appeals directly to Antoinette's personal experience or interests
may have no purchase at all on Beauregard, Carlos, Dottie, or any of
100 other students in the room. Moreover, ad hominem arguments that
would work in a more private setting might be simultaneously ineffec-
tive and inappropriate in such a public forum. Antoinette might be
embarrassed rather than edified if a teacher points out the inconsis-
tencies in her personal statements and opinions. She might experi-
ence the intervention as an insulting attack, and she might dedicate
herself to parrying such attacks rather than to reforming her opinions
(in one common view, it is the desire to teach this rhetorical skill that
justifies the use of the "Socratic method" in law school classrooms).
Indeed, there is no particular reason to suppose that Antoinette
(or any other law student) would welcome such ad hominem discus-
sions even in friendlier, private settings. Law students are pretty well
formed people-by which I do not mean that they are rightly formed,
but that they are, for better or worse, set in their ways. The youngest
law students tend to be around twenty-one years old and some are
much older. In his brilliant Emile, Jean-Jacques Rousseau contended
that the most critical period for moral education occurred with the
onset of sexual desire. 6 We need not endorse that judgment to recog-
nize that law students are adults rather than children, and (like most
adults) they think they know themselves-their values, their wants,
and so on. Law students want their teachers to help them get what
they want, not to tell them (or remind them!) what they "really" want
or should want.
Among other things, law students know (or think they know)
what career they want for themselves. They want to be lawyers. This
simple fact narrows significantly the kind of impact a law professor
who paid close attention to judicial opinions early in their adult lives. See id. at 1008-10. As
one might infer from the general themes of this essay, I am now more doubtful about
whether such effects exist-although it remains possible that Supreme Court opinions will
influence how lawyers view their professional identity. See infra Part II.D.
6. SeeJEAN-JAcQUEs RoussEAu, EMILE, OR ON EDUCATION 232-33 (A. Bloom trans.,
1979).
[Vol. 36
TEACHING VALUES SYMPOSIUM
can have. The decision to go to law school might be life changing, but
that decision has been made. Law professors can, of course, persuade
a shaken student to stay in law school. They can also (in various ways,
including by teaching so badly that the experience is unbearable) con-
vince students to leave law school. But it is much more likely that un-
dergraduate faculty can change lives in this way-for example, by
convincing a student who had always planned to go to law school that
finance is her true calling. And teachers who mentor even younger
students can expand their horizons in more profound ways-such as
by getting a student who had never considered attending college, or
leaving her hometown, to do so.
The fact that law students are training to be lawyers has other
implications. Becoming a lawyer might involve, among other things,
acquiring certain "habits of mind" that are useful to the practice of
law. 7 Such habits may embody or reinforce certain values. For exam-
ple, becoming a lawyer may involve developing a heightened sensitiv-
ity to linguistic imprecision, and this sensitivity may correlate with a
respect for rationalism, articulate justification, or what political theo-
rists call "public reason." A law school that inculcates such value laden
habits of mind would in a real sense be "teaching values." But it would
be teaching values in a way that was largely independent of pedagogi-
cal decisions by individual teachers or even curricular decisions by in-
dividual law schools. If acquiring the habit is genuinely necessary to
becoming a good lawyer, then no successful law school could refuse to
communicate the habit to its students. To be sure, the law school
might try to make students more self-conscious about the habit, or
limit its extreme manifestations. My point is only that, here again, stu-
dents' aspirations to be lawyers will constrain the kind of teaching that
law schools can do.
It is also worth noting that by comparison to other "teachers"-
especially parents-law professors have only limited means by which
to teach values. Professors can lecture, question, mentor, befriend, ca-
jole, criticize, and grade. In most cases, they will see their students for
only a few hours a week, often in large groups. Parents, by contrast,
can feed, dress, nurture, kiss, berate, awaken, and punish their chil-
dren. They control almost the totality of their children's environment,
especially during the crucial pre-school years. They can decide what
their children will wear; where and when their children will eat; when
they can go out; and where (and, in the pre-school years, whether)
7. James Boyd White has argued this point with special subtlety. See, e.g.,JAMES BOYD
WHITE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION (1990).
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they will go to school. Parents can announce that their toddlers will go
to the grocery store, and if the toddlers resist, parents can scoop them
up and put them in the car. This comes close to (perhaps it goes be-
yond) the quasi-tyrannical power we imagined exercising in order to
make Antoinette experience the pains of poverty. Such extraordinary
dominion empowers parents to shape the habits and values of their
children. Law professors have (thank goodness!) no comparable con-
trol over their students.
These considerations suggest we should be skeptical about grand
exhortations that call upon law professors to improve the values of
their students. The capacity of law professors to teach values will be
modest at best. Yet, even if law professors cannot teach values at all,
their teaching may be able to increase the likelihood that American
lawyers will practice ethically. I explore this paradoxical suggestion in
the next Part, but I can state the basic idea quickly: most law students
come to law school with decent values. If teachers can strengthen stu-
dents, by giving them skills, opportunities, and resolve needed to act
on the values they already have, then teachers can improve the behav-
ior of their students without changing their values. My emphasis in
the next Part, then, will be on how teachers can improve the legal
profession by making students stronger, rather than by making them
more virtuous.
II. Making Good Students Stronger
A. Reinforcing the Connection Between Law and Justice
Oddly enough, some American lawyers take pride in their ability
to disregard justice. They suppose that lawyers must be faithful to the
law rather than to justice, and that tough minded lawyers will there-
fore not care much about justice. In the mythology of American law,
this attitude is exemplified by the great Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Holmes wrote to a friend, "I have said to my brethren that I hate jus-
tice, which means that I know that if a man begins to talk about that,
for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms."8
Holmes is also the star of a famous story told byJudge Learned Hand.
In the story, Hand rides with his mentor Holmes to the Supreme
Court. As they part, Hand cries out, "Do justice!" Holmes beckons
Hand near, and admonishes him: "That is not myjob. My job is to play
8. THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 435 (Max Lerner ed., 1943).
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the game according to the rules."9 Hand relished this story and the
lesson it conveyed. Other prominent judges and lawyers have em-
braced it with kindred enthusiasm. Some law professors relate the
story to their students, as a way of telling them what it means to be-
come a lawyer.
It is remarkable that American lawyers would lionize judges for
professing their indifference to justice. Of course, these lawyers do
not really hate justice, any more than Holmes himself did. The story
about Hand and Holmes is a dramatic way to make a more plausible
point-namely, that doing justice will often require judges and law-
yers to defer to whatever opinions have been embodied in the law,
rather than to act on their own, independent judgments about the
substantive matter at hand. Still, one can make this point without
sneering at justice.
Indeed, although lawyers must not disregard the law in favor of
their own, personal judgments about justice, one might suppose that
they ought also to struggle mightily to keep law and justice in accord
with one another so far as is possible. There are great judges in Ameri-
can history-John Marshall, Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo,
for example-who spoke no insults to justice. Holmes and his col-
leagues on the Supreme Court are honored with the title of 'Justice,"
rather than "Umpire" or "Referee." The Court's building bears the
inscription "Equal Justice Under Law," not "The Rules of the Game"
or "We Hate Justice." Imagine the reaction of visitors if it were
otherwise!
In my book Constitutional Self-Government'0 and elsewhere, I have
argued that Holmes was wrong to think that somebody who speaks
aboutjustice has thereby ceased to speak in legal terms. I have argued
that, on the contrary, it is impossible to speak competently about the
law without speaking about justice. I have propounded the same view
in my classroom teaching. I offer the view as a way of understanding
the law and adjudicative institutions, not as an ethics lesson for my
students, but it has both ethical content and ethical consequences.
The view has ethical content because the case in favor of connecting
law and justice depends upon how one interprets the value of democ-
racy. It has ethical consequences because it recommends that judges
consult their convictions about justice when they construe the law-
9. The many tellings of this story are described in Michael Herz, "DoJustice."': Varia-
tions on a Thrice-Told Tae, 82 VA. L. REv. 111 (1996).
10. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 71, 211, & passim
(2001).
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and hence that lawyers, including law students, think about justice
when they interpret the law.
Some people might, I suppose, regard this sort of argument as a
way of "teaching values"-certainly it propounds a value laden ac-
count of the legal process. But to say that I am "teaching values"
strikes me as imprecise. I am not, for example, teaching students to
value justice or democracy; on the contrary, my arguments about the
connection between law and justice presuppose that the students are
already committed to justice and democracy (my arguments analyze
the implications of those commitments). Nor do I try to tell students
how they should understand justice-on the contrary, my principal
point is to emphasize that they should not ignore or put aside their
conceptions ofjustice (whatever those may be) when they think about
the law.
I am not, in other words, trying to change or improve students'
values; instead, I seek to equip students with a theory of the legal pro-
cess that frees them to act upon their pre-existing commitments to
democracy and justice. If successful, such teaching may fortify stu-
dents who are already disposed to do good, but it presupposes rather
than creates that disposition. It thus represents one way in which law
school teachers can strengthen students who already have good
values.
B. Individual Mentorship
In Part I, I suggested that values might best be taught (if they can
be taught at all) through ad hominem argument in one on one settings.
Mentorship relationships-the kind that form, for example, around a
successful independent research project-provide a context in which
discussions of that kind might occur. Sheer numbers ensure that these
kinds of relationships will be the exception rather than the rule: stu-
dents far outnumber faculty, and if these relationships are to be sites
of real teaching-rather than mere sources for recommendation let-
ters-they demand time and energy. But when such relationships
form, they can generate rich discussions of the ethical issues that at-
tend a life in the law.
In my own experience, healthy mentoring relationships develop
best with a certain set of students: those who are not only intelligent
and willing to work hard, but who are also genuinely eager to subject
their own ideas and commitments to criticism in the hope of getting
closer to the truth about law, morality, and justice. Students who have
these traits bring a good set of values to the relationship before it
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begins; they have what are, in my view, the most crucial and rarest
ingredients of good character. With such students, it is possible to en-
gage in deep and productive argument that might change their
mind-or my mind-about things that matter. Yet, it is far from clear
that these exchanges amount to "teaching values" rather than to
building upon values that were already embraced.
Yet, even if professors cannot teach values to their students, they
may be able to improve the prospects of students who already have the
kind of good character needed for meaningful mentoring relation-
ships. When I look back at the students whom I have mentored, I can-
not say with any confidence that I have taught values to them (nor is
that what I conceived of myself as doing). On the other hand, in at
least some cases, I have enabled these students to complete projects
they would not otherwise have done, or to improve the quality of
those projects, or to get jobs they wanted, or to weather difficulties of
one kind or another. I like to think that, in these ways, I have made a
difference in their lives.
Helping good students do well would be a good thing even if the
only beneficiaries were the particular students aided. Yet, if many
teachers help many students of good character, the teachers' efforts
may also change the profession as a whole. Morally arbitrary charac-
teristics (including race, sex, trivial differences in intellectual talent,
personality, connections, and appearance) often play a crucial role in
determining who gets ajob. By giving good students a boost, teachers
may increase the likelihood that those students will eventually win
leadership positions-and this redistribution of professional power
may change the profession and make it more ethical, even if the
teachers never make any individual student more ethical.
C. Prudential Lessons for the Well-Intentioned
I began this essay by expressing doubts about whether profes-
sional responsibility classes can deter rascals from misbehaving. Fortu-
nately, however, most law students are well-intentioned rather than
corrupt-but we all know what kind of roads are paved with good in-
tentions. And, indeed, casebooks on professional responsibility are fil-
led with tales of unfortunate slobs who-through carelessness and a
touch of laziness or greed, rather than gross moral turpitude-en-
snarled themselves in conflicts of interest, assumed responsibilities
they did not want or could not handle, disclosed privileged communi-
cations, and so on. Students who pay attention can learn something
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about how to steer clear of trouble. Both they and their clients will
benefit.
For example, students usually assume that giving free legal advice
to friends, neighbors, and casual acquaintances is a kind of favor-
giving away a service for which others would charge. It is, in other
words, the sort of thing that a good, generous person would do. The
students are accordingly shocked to learn that casual advice may sub-
ject them to malpractice liability.'1 This rule provides lawyers with an
incentive never to dispense free advice. Some students are tempted to
conclude that the law induces lawyers to act less ethically: in particular,
the threat of liability encourages them to hoard their expertise, as An-
toinette might do, rather than share it, as their generous instincts
would have them do. But, pushed to probe deeper, the students dis-
cover that there are real risks to giving casual advice. Non-lawyers
often assume that the law speaks unambiguously to whatever problems
concern them. They may also assume that competent lawyers know
the law (all of it!) off the top of their heads. These assumptions create
a hazard. A lawyer may offer a plausible, unresearched guess about
what the law says; her neighbor may receive it as a definitive pro-
nouncement of legal fact. And the neighbor may, quite literally, bet
the ranch on the assumption that the pronouncement is true. The
magnitude of this risk is an open question, but well-intentioned stu-
dents will be more ethical lawyers if they appreciate its existence.
Conflicts of interest provide another example. Under some cir-
cumstances, it may seem harmless, and even ungracious, for a lawyer
to refuse matters from two clients with potentially adverse interests.
The two clients might be longstanding friends of the lawyer, for exam-
ple; they might have an amicable relation with one another, and the
lawyer might be confident that he or she could sort out any conflicts
that arose.' 2 Under such circumstances, what purpose is served by fas-
tidious insistence on the rules governing conflicts of interest? Why not
let both clients have the lawyer they want? Of course, the lawyer al-
most always has a self-interested reason for wanting to suppose that
the conflict is illusory. If the lawyer turns away one client, the lawyer
will certainly lose fees in the short run and may lose the client's future
business too. Attentive students can learn to guard against the possibil-
11. The crucial question is whether an attorney/client relationship was formed; for
discussion of trends in the law, see STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS IN
LAW AND ETHICS 18-21 (5th ed. 1998).
12. For a fact pattern of this kind, see, e.g., Simpson v. James, 903 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.
1990).
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ity that financial self-interest will lead them to minimize real conflicts.
They can also learn why conflicts matter-that is, they can see how
representations that at first seemed innocuous unravel when small
facts change.
Professional responsibility courses are in large part about what it
means to have a client-more specifically, about what it means to
serve a client and about the pressures that result when one's liveli-
hood depends upon retaining clients. Few students have thought hard
about such problems. Even fewer have any experience with them. No
matter how good their values or character, students may have trouble
anticipating the stresses and complexities of the attorney/client rela-
tionship. Forewarned is forearmed; by making students aware of hid-
den traps and dangers, legal ethics classes may enable new lawyers to
practice more ethically even if such classes do not teach them any
values they did not already embrace.
D. Instilling a Vocational Interest in the Law
Strong temptations may lure even lawyers with good values to be-
have unethically. For example, small, apparently trivial ethical com-
promises (such as ignoring an apparently harmless conflict of
interest) might seem crucial to achieving large rewards-retaining a
client, securing a partnership, or winning a case. To help lawyers resist
temptation, what matters is not that they be given better values but
rather that they be motivated to act on their values.
The question of what motivates ethical behavior, like the question
of how (if at all) virtue can be taught, is philosophically vexed. There
is one obvious way to solve the problem, though, and that is by remov-
ing the conflict: if what is ethical is also in a lawyer's interest, then we
need not worry about whether she will have nerve enough to stand by
her convictions. That is one point of legal sanctions. By imposing civil
or criminal liability for wrongful acts, we give people a self-interested
reason to do the right thing-namely, if they do the wrong thing, and
they are caught, they will pay for their actions. James Madison's de-
fense of the constitutional separation of powers on the ground that it
connects "the interests of the man ... with the constitutional rights of
the place" is a more subtle version of the same idea. 13
One way to give lawyers a self-interested reason to behave ethi-
cally is through disciplinary rules. As with ordinary tort or criminal
law, lawyers who violate the disciplinary rules and get caught will pay a
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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price for their actions. That "price" is an incentive for even selfish
lawyers to avoid ethical infractions. Yet, obviously, disciplinary rules
are an awkward, imperfect mechanism for producing ethical behavior.
Detecting unethical behavior is often difficult; enforcing the rules
may be costly; and "doing nothing wrong" is not the same thing as
"doing good." Ideally, we should like to have self-interested reasons
for lawyers to behave ethically even when they are not worried about
being caught and disciplined.
A well-shaped sense of professional identity might give lawyers an
incentive to behave ethically, and leaders (including teachers) may
have some capacity to shape how law students and lawyers see them-
selves. The possibility is nicely illustrated by a news story from 1997.
Lawyers at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri were publishing a
weekly newsletter entitled, "Nooseletter." The head of the Air Combat
Command's legal office, Brigadier General William Moorman, saw the
newsletter and ordered that it be renamed. In his memorandum to
the lawyers, Moorman wrote, "Do you proudly proclaim yourself as a
'hang-'em-high-judge' or do you take pride in the fact that you are
interested in truth, fairness, justice, equitable treatment and good or-
der and discipline?" 14 If lawyers want to see themselves as dedicated to
truth, justice, and equitable treatment, that aspiration will motivate
them to behave ethically. They will feel better about themselves if they
live up to a high standard.
More generally, lawyers may be inspired to behave ethically inso-
far as they internalize a conception of professional success distinct
from making money, exercising power, or winning cases. Law schools
sometimes give students remarkably little to work with in this regard.
To be sure, almost every law school urges its students to do something
besides make money-but the usual alternative is "public service," in
the form either of "pro bono" work or a career as a public interest
attorney. I cringed through several graduation ceremonies while some
speaker hammered home the moral imperative for every student to go
into civil rights practice, thereby impugning the integrity of most of
the law school's graduates, who were bound for practice at large firms.
Scolding the graduates for their career path makes little sense. Even
putting aside financial considerations, the competition for some pub-
lic interestjobs is keen, and students who want them cannot always get
14. Elaine Sciolino, Air Force Orders Lawyers to Review Procedures for Fairness, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 1997, at A10.
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them. 15 Pro bono work is a more realistic, though often onerous, op-
tion for many law students. On the one hand, young lawyers can do
pro bono work while they pursue careers in private practice; on the
other hand, most firms regard pro bono work as a supplement to
(rather than a substitute for) income producing billable hours. As a
result, pro bono commitments tend to lengthen work schedules that
are already so demanding as to be almost inhuman, especially for law-
yers with families.
Insofar as students have chosen to go into the private practice of
law, the incessant equation of "ethical lawyering" with "public interest
law" can actually have a negative effect: It can convince young lawyers
that they have "sold out," and so dissuade them from asking what it
would mean to live ethically within the career they have chosen for
themselves. For lawyers to have a satisfying sense of professional iden-
tity, they must have a model of ethical practice that is at least poten-
tially consistent with the careers they actually have, rather than with
others that they have rejected or that are unavailable to them. Lawyers
must be able to treat law as their calling, rather than just as a way to
make money (perhaps a lot of money); they must find value in the
ordinary practice of law. They must be able to take pride in their work
even when their clients are not angels, their cause is not glorious, and
their salary is not ballooning (or even rising). There are at least four
possible sources of such pride: pride in helping clients; pride in the
craft of law; pride in how one treats one's co-workers, employees, and
adversaries; and pride in one's role as contributor to a larger system of
legal justice.
Perhaps law schools can help students to develop a sense of pro-
fessional identity consistent with the kinds of practice they are likely to
have. In theory, at least, law schools might do so by supplying positive
(ordinary and achievable, rather than heroic) role models; by discuss-
ing explicitly what it means to live ethically in the law; by illuminating
the law's connection to justice and other values; or by introducing
students to the intellectual pleasures that can accompany the analysis
of legal problems, both in the classroom and in practice. I'm not sure
how much impact any of these techniques can have. Once again, it
may matter more what students bring to law school than what law
15. A careful and useful analysis of law school graduates' career choices is Lewis Korn-
hauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: The Role of
Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 829 (1995). On jobs in the public
interest sector, see id. at 842-46; on the competition for "elite" public interest jobs, see id.
at 915.
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school gives to them. Or, alternatively, it may be that conceptions of
professional identity are shaped by the incentives young lawyers en-
counter in the workplace, rather than by law school lessons. But per-
haps not; perhaps creative teaching can help to endow young lawyers
with a constructive sense of professional pride. Certainly there is little
to lose from trying.
Conclusion
We hear much nowadays about the importance of teaching val-
ues, in law schools and elsewhere. Sometimes it seems as though law-
yers and law professors want to see themselves as makers and
interpreters of people, rather than as makers and interpreters of laws.
That is ironic but understandable. Insofar as people are self-inter-
ested, we must rely on regulations and institutions to give them incen-
tives to respect the interests of others. Such strategies are often
ineffective and sometimes oppressive. How much better it would be if
people freely chose to care about their neighbors, countrymen, and
fellow human beings! Moral education therefore holds great promise:
if successful, it simultaneously respects people's freedom and makes
them behave better.
Unfortunately, moral education is difficult. For purposes of poli-
cymaking in liberal democracies, we may have to take adult human
beings-including law students and lawyers-more or less as we find
them. Campaigns for moral education seem, at least if targeted at free
adults, likely to do more harm than good. At best, they are ineffective
and divert energy from more practical reform strategies; at worst, they
degenerate into tiresome and destructive "culture wars" about which
lifestyles are praiseworthy and which are to blame for the nation's
ills.16
I do not mean to be pessimistic. Though people are not angels
and few are saints, neither are they demons. Nearly all care in some
measure about the interests of others, and some care greatly. We may
be able to nurture the better instincts of human nature in various
16. I make a related argument in Christopher L. Eisgruber, Civic Virtue and the Limits
of Constitutionalism, 69 FORD. L. REv. 2131, 2150 (2001) ("If ... we neglect the limits of
constitutionalism, there is a risk that we will damage or destroy valuable constitutional
rights in a well-intentioned quest to create societal virtues that, no matter how noble or
commendable, are simply not achievable through constitutional law."). For purposes of
this essay, there is no need to consider what forms of moral education (if any) are likely to
be effective in elementary and secondary schools, but I have pursued the issue elsewhere:
Christopher L. Eisgruber, How Do Liberal Democracies Teach Values?, NOMOS XLIII: MORAL
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002).
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ways-for example, by alleviating the burdens of poverty, crime, and
violence; by enabling parents to spend more time with their children;
and by facilitating access to higher education. I am also inclined to
believe that sustained public deliberation about moral issues can, over
generations, improve the moral character of a people.
Nor am I skeptical about the value of ambitious, dedicated, and
energetic teaching, in law schools and elsewhere. Good teaching can
deepen students' understandings of the roles and institutions they will
inhabit; it can equip them with insights, theories, and skills to address
new problems; and it can inspire students to achieve more than they
had thought possible. If teaching cannot make students good, it can
nevertheless fortify and nurture the good that is already in them.
I am very skeptical, however, about whether we can improve stu-
dent character or reform American society by tweaking the moral con-
tent of school curricula, in law schools or elsewhere. Humanity's
crooked timber is not so easily made straight.17 Regulations and insti-
tutions-in other words, the laws, broadly defined-may be the best
mechanisms for improving the behavior of human beings who are, by
their natures, durably imperfect. That message is, among other things,
an important one to convey to students who have chosen to become
not teachers but lawyers and who need to appreciate the dignity of
their calling.
17. The metaphor is from Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIB-
ERTY 170 (1969).
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